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Abstract
In the framework of evolutionary games with institutional reciprocity, limited incentives are at disposal for
rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. In the simplest case, it can be assumed that, depending on
their strategies, all players receive equal incentives from the common pool. The question arises, however, what
is the optimal distribution of institutional incentives? How should we best reward and punish individuals for
cooperation to thrive? We study this problem for the public goods game on a scale-free network. We show
that if the synergetic effects of group interactions are weak, the level of cooperation in the population can
be maximized simply by adopting the simplest “equal distribution” scheme. If synergetic effects are strong,
however, it is best to reward high-degree nodes more than low-degree nodes. These distribution schemes for
institutional rewards are independent of payoff normalization. For institutional punishment, however, the same
optimization problem is more complex, and its solution depends on whether absolute or degree-normalized
payoffs are used. We find that degree-normalized payoffs require high-degree nodes be punished more lenient
than low-degree nodes. Conversely, if absolute payoffs count, then high-degree nodes should be punished
stronger than low-degree nodes.
Introduction
In human societies, cooperation is essential for the maintenance of public goods. However, the collapse
of cooperation happens often in many public goods dilemmas which we nowadays face, like protecting the
global climate or avoiding overfishing of our oceans [1, 2]. For avoiding the tragedy of the commons [1], we
often rely on institutions to enforce public cooperation and acceptable behavior. Although institutionalized
punishment appears to be more common than institutionalized reward, both concepts are in use throughout
the world. Recently, ample research efforts have been devoted to the study of the emergence of institutions and
their effectiveness in promoting prosocial behavior [3–19]. It has been shown, for example, that institutional
rewarding promotes the evolution of cooperation in the liner public goods game [7], the nonlinear public goods
games [20], and in structured populations in general [11,12,21,22]. However, institutional punishment is less
costly and thus more effective to warrant a given level of public cooperation, especially if participation in the
public goods game is optional [14, 23].
Besides the obvious stick versus carrot dilemma [24–26], the question emerges how to best make use
of the available resources, which inevitably are finite [27, 28]. In particular, we wish to make optimal use
of different forms of reciprocity to promote human cooperation [29–33]. One plausible approach appears
to be allocating the resources depending on the properties of the interaction network that describes the
connections among us. Surprisingly, few studies have thus far considered the problem of the optimal allocation
of incentives for maximizing public cooperation. Traditionally, all groups and all individuals are considered
equal, and depending on their strategies thus deserved of the same reward or punishment [14, 20, 21]. This
simple assumption, however, does not agree with the fact that in social networks individuals have different
roles, which depend significantly on the degree of the node that they occupy. Indeed, the prominent role
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of heterogeneous interaction networks for the successful evolution of cooperation is firmly established and
well known [34–57], and the reasonable assumption is that the incentives should likely also be distributed
accordingly for optimal evolutionary outcomes. In the framework of evolutionary graph theory the interaction
groups are diverse, and naturally thus the provided incentives within each group should also be different. The
number of links an individual player has is traditionally assumed to be a good proxy for that player’s influence
and importance. In this sense, it is interesting and highly relevant to determine how to distribute the incentives
in the light of this heterogeneity.
Here we consider the spatial public goods game [58] with institutional reciprocity on a scale-free network
[59, 60], where the assumption is that the incentives at disposal for rewarding cooperators and punishing
defectors are limited. We assume that the budget available to each group is proportional to its size, and that
the distribution of the incentives depends on the number of individual links within the group. Our aim is
to arrive at a thorough understanding of how the incentives should be best distributed to maximize public
cooperation. In what follows, we present the results obtained with the model described in the Methods section,
to where we refer for details. As we will show, if the enhancement factor r is small, the level of cooperation
can be maximized simply by adopting the simplest “equal distribution” scheme. If the value of r is large,
however, it is best to reward high-degree nodes more than low-degree nodes. Unlike for institutionalized
rewards, the optimal distribution of resources within the framework of institutional punishment depends on
whether absolute or degree-normalized payoffs are used. High-degree nodes should be punished more lenient
than low-degree nodes if degree-normalized payoffs apply, while high-degree nodes should be punished stronger
than low-degree nodes if absolute payoffs count.
Results
We perform Monte Carlo simulations of the public goods game described in the Methods section, whereby we
consider separately institutional rewarding with absolute payoffs and institutional punishment with absolute
payoffs, as well as institutional rewarding with degree-normalized payoffs and institutional punishment with
degree-normalized payoffs. As the key parameters we consider the enhancement factor r, the average amount
of available incentives δ, and the distribution strength of incentives α (see Methods for details). We determine
the stationary fractions of cooperators in the stationary state on networks comprising N = 1000 to 10000
nodes. The final results are averaged over 100 independent initial conditions to further enhance accuracy.
Institutional rewarding with absolute payoffs
Figure 1 shows the stationary fraction of cooperators for two different values of the enhancement factor r.
When the enhancement factor is small [Fig. 1(a) and (c)], defectors always dominate if δ < 0.2, and this
regardless of the value of α. For intermediate values of δ, the cooperation level can be maximized at an
intermediate value of the distribution strength α, which ought to be close to zero. This indicates that an
equal distribution of positive incentives, regardless of the degree of players within the group, is the optimal
distribution scheme for public cooperation. For high values of δ, the cooperation level increases with increasing
the value of α. If the enhancement factor r increases [Fig. 1(b) and (d)], defectors still dominate for small
values of δ and regardless of the value of α. However, the nonmonotonous dependence of the fraction
of cooperators on the distribution strength α disappears for intermediate values of δ. Instead, the highest
cooperation level is attainable for large values of α.
Intuitively, it is possible to understand that when the enhancement factor is small, a modest positive
incentive is not enough to reverse the doom of cooperators, no matter which distribution scheme is used [14].
Conversely, if the incentives are large and targeted preferentially towards influential players, they can have a
high payoff even if the part stemming from the public goods game is small. In agreement with the traditional
argument of network reciprocity [34, 61, 62], only cooperators are able to forge a long-term advantage out of
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this favorable situation and build sizable cooperative groups. Thus, for high-enough values of α, which favor
the distribution of rewards towards high-degree nodes, the evolution of public cooperation is successful.
To gain an understanding of the optimal intermediate value of the average amount of available incentives
δ requires more effort. First, we show in Fig. 2 the payoff differences between cooperators and defectors as
well as the fraction of cooperators as a function of degree k during different typical evolutionary stages of the
game. We observe that for α = 0, which implies an “equal distribution” scheme irrespective of the degree
of players, the payoff of cooperators is higher than that of the corresponding defectors, and this regardless of
k. Thus, cooperators can successfully occupy all nodes of the networks. In contrast, for negative values of α,
the payoff of cooperators with high or middle degree is less than that of the corresponding defectors, while
cooperators with low degree have a higher mean payoff than defectors with small degree. Because there are
interconnections among different types of nodes, and because the Fermi strategy updating rule is adopted,
cooperators can coexist with defectors at equilibrium. But defectors can occupy most of the nodes in the
network, since low-degree cooperators do not obtain a high enough payoff to spread their strategy across the
network. For positive values of α, the payoff of cooperators with high and middle degree is larger than that
of the corresponding defectors, while cooperators with low degree have a lower mean payoff than defectors
with low degree. In addition, high-degree cooperators obtain a sufficiently high payoff through institutional
rewarding that enables them to spread the cooperative strategy also towards some of the auxiliary low-degree
nodes. Accordingly, cooperative behavior prevails over defection, but the stationary state is still a mixed C+D
phase — cooperators are unable to dominate completely.
To further corroborate our arguments, we show in Fig. 3 the payoff difference between cooperators and
defectors as well as the fraction of cooperators in dependence on degree k, as obtained for a two times larger
value of r than used in Fig. 2. In comparison, it can be observed that for α ≤ 0 the results remain unchanged.
For α > 0, on the other hand, the process of evolution is different from what we have presented in Fig. 2.
During the early stages of evolution [Fig. 3 (a) and (b)], cooperators with low degree can have a lower mean
payoff than low-degree defectors, while cooperators with middle and high degree can have a higher mean payoff
than the corresponding defectors. Further in time, cooperators succeed in occupying all high-degree nodes
[Fig. 3 (g)], and even low-degree cooperators have a payoff comparable to that of low-degree defectors [Fig. 3
(c)]. Cooperators can eventually invade the whole network [Fig. 3 (h)], thus giving rise to the absorbing C
phase at r = 2, which emerges for sufficiently large values of α and intermediate values of δ.
Institutional punishment with absolute payoffs
Figure 4 shows that when the enhancement factor is small, cooperators are unable to survive for small values
of δ, and this irrespective of the value of α. For intermediate values of δ, the highest cooperation level is
attained at an intermediate value of the distribution strength α, which is almost equal to zero, like by the
consideration of institutional reward in the preceding subsection. This indicates that, for small enhancement
factors, in case of institutional punishment too an “equal distribution” scheme works best for the evolution of
public cooperation. If δ is large — if resources for punishment abound — cooperators can always dominate,
regardless of the value of α. For a two times larger value or r cooperators are favored even more, so that the
nonmonotonous dependence of the cooperation level on α at intermediate values of δ vanishes. Instead, the
fraction of cooperators simply increases with increasing values of α. Thus, the more the high-degree defectors
are punished, the better for the evolution of public cooperation.
It is understandable that low values of r, paired with modest resources for punishing defectors, lead to
the dominance of defectors, regardless of the value of α. Conversely, if the resources abound, defectors are
punished severely and cooperators dominate. In this limit example the distribution of fines between low,
middle and high degree nodes does not play an important role. If, however, the combination of values of
r and δ just barely, or not at all, support the survivability of cooperators, then the value of α, and thus
the particular distribution of incentives (in this case fines), plays a significant role. With the aim to explain
this nontrivial dependence on α, we show in Fig. 5 the payoff difference between cooperators and defectors
as well as the fraction of cooperators as a function of degree k during different stages of the evolutionary
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process. It can be observed that for α = 0 cooperators can always have a higher payoff than the defectors
with the same corresponding degree [Fig. 5 (a)-(c)]. Cooperators can thus rise to complete dominance. While
for α < 0, however, low-degree cooperators can have a higher mean payoff than low-degree defectors, while
cooperators with middle or high degree can’t match the corresponding defectors during the early stages of the
evolution [Fig. 5 (a)]. Defectors can therefore, over time, occupy the high-degree and middle-degree nodes
[Fig. 5 (f)]. This invasion can decrease the fraction of cooperators on low-degree nodes [63]. Accordingly,
the payoff difference between cooperators and defectors on these nodes continues to be negative, although
low-degree defectors receive the negative incentives. Ultimately cooperators therefore die out. For α > 0,
on the other hand, defectors with higher degree are punished preferentially — they receive a bigger share
of fines from the available fond than low-degree defectors. Due to the small enhancement factor and the
institutional punishment, both high-degree cooperators and high-degree defectors have negative payoffs. In
fact, low-degree players can have a higher payoff than high-degree players, despite of the fact that we use
absolute payoffs in this particular case. Either way, defectors can easily invade low-degree nodes [Fig. 5(f)],
and they can spread further towards middle and high degree nodes, although at the beginning of evolution
cooperators have a higher payoff than defectors on these nodes. The ultimate consequence is that defectors
dominate completely [Fig. 5 (h)].
It remains of interest to explain why the dependence on α disappears at intermediate values of δ for
r = 2. For this purpose, we show in Fig. 6 the same quantities as in Fig. 5, from where it follows that
the results do not change for α ≤ 0. However, for α > 0 the differences are clearly inferable. For r = 2
the high-degree cooperators can obtain a positive payoff, and naturally they then have a higher payoff than
high-degree defectors, because the latter receive ample negative incentives from the institutional punishment
pool [Fig. 6 (a)-(c)]. Cooperators can therefore occupy high-degree nodes and from there spread across the
whole population [Fig. 6 (g)], and this the more effectively the higher the value of α.
Institutional rewarding with degree-normalized payoffs
From here onwards we turn to considering degree-normalized payoffs, which can have important negative
consequences for the evolution of public cooperation in heterogeneous environments if compared to absolute
payoffs [38,41,64–66]. As shown in Fig. 7, the fraction of cooperators unsurprisingly increases with increasing
δ for various distribution strength α (top panels). Furthermore, at small values of r, for small values of δ
defectors always dominate, regardless of the value of α, while for intermediate values of δ cooperators recover
gradually as α increases. For high δ values there exists an intermediate close-to-zero value of α that maximizes
the stationary fraction of cooperators [Fig. 7(a) and (d)]. When the enhancement factor is larger, the extent
of the parameter region where the nonmonotonous phenomenon can be observed decreased. Instead, for high
values of δ, the cooperation level increases with increasing values of α and the area of complete cooperator
dominance increases as well [Fig. 7(e) and (f)]. If comparing the results presented in Fig. 7 with those presented
in Fig. 1, we find that the nonmonotonous phenomenon still exists, and it can appear even at larger values
of r because of the consideration of degree-normalized payoffs. In general, however, the explanation of these
results and the evolutionary mechanisms behind are the same as those described when considering institutional
rewarding with absolute payoffs.
Institutional punishment with degree-normalized payoffs
Lastly, we consider institutional punishment with degree-normalized payoffs. From the results presented in
Fig. 8 it follows that the stationary fraction of cooperators increases with increasing values of δ, and this
regardless of the value of α (top panels). When the enhancement factor is small, we can see that the
nonmonotonous dependence of the fraction of cooperators on α exists at intermediate values of the average
incentive δ [Fig. 8(d)]. When the enhancement factor increases, this phenomenon still exists, but the extent of
the parameter region where the nonmonotonous dependence can be observed decreases [Fig. 8(e)]. Surprisingly,
when the enhancement factor increases further, the nonmonotonous dependence disappears. Instead, in a
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narrow region of intermediate δ values, the fraction of cooperators decreases with increasing values of α. At
the same time, the extent of the full cooperation area increases while the full defection region decreases in the
considered (α, δ) parameter space [Fig. 8(f)].
While the underlying mechanism for the nonmonotonous dependence on α is qualitatively identical to that
reported before when considering institutional punishment with absolute payoffs, the decrease of the level of
cooperation at intermediate values of δ and r = 3 as α increases requires special attention. We note that when
the value of r is large, low-degree cooperators can still have a positive payoff. For negative α, these low-degree
cooperators can even have the highest payoffs because of the consideration of degree-normalized payoffs and
sufficiently high values of δ to weigh heavily on the defectors. Therefore, cooperators dominate on all low-
degree nodes and from there spread further across the whole network and rise to dominance. This atypical
spreading is a unique consequence of the consideration of the optimal distribution of negative incentives from
the punishment pool, and it highlights the importance of the parameter α. For positive values of α namely,
because most of the negative incentives are then assigned to high-degree defectors and there are only a few of
those in the entire population [59], the majority of low-degree defectors is not punished at all. The previously
described spreading of cooperators from the low-degree nodes outwards is therefore impaired, which ultimately
results in an overall lower stationary fraction of cooperators. Instead of cooperation, for larger values of α the
low-degree nodes “emit” defection throughout the population.
Discussion
To summarize, we have studied how to best distribute limited institutional incentives in order to maximize
public cooperation on scale-free networks. We have considered both institutional rewarding of cooperators and
institutional punishment of defectors, and we have also distinguished between absolute and degree-normalized
payoffs. Our key assumptions was that, since in heterogeneous environments players have a different number
of partners, the incentives ought to be distributed by taking this into account. This would be in agreement
with the established importance of degree heterogeneity for cooperation in evolutionary games [35, 44, 67].
Traditionally, however, previous research has considered the limited budged be distributed equally among all
the potential recipients of the incentives, irrespective of the players status and influence within the network.
Accordingly, how to distribute the incentives to optimize public cooperation was an important open problem.
We have found interesting solutions on how to optimally distribute the incentives based on each player’s
social influence level, the proxy for which are the number of social ties the players have within the interaction
network. We have shown that sharing the incentives equally among all regardless of status is optimal only if the
social dilemma is strong and the propensity to contribute to the common pool is thus weak, and if in addition
the available amount of incentives is intermediate. This result is valid for both institutional punishment
and institutional rewarding, and it does not depend on whether absolute or degree-normalized payoffs count
towards evolutionary fitness. However, if the environment already favors cooperative behavior — when the
public goods game is characterized with a high enhancement factor — then it is best to reward influential
players more than low-degree players, and this regardless of whether absolute or degree-normalized payoffs
apply. For institutional punishment, on the other hand, the solution of the optimization problem depends on
whether absolute or degree-normalized payoffs are used. We have shown that degree-normalized payoffs require
high-degree nodes be punished more lenient than low-degree nodes, while if absolute payoffs count, then high-
degree nodes should be punished stronger than low-degree nodes. In general, rewarding influential cooperators
strongly and punishing auxiliary defectors leniently appears to be optimal for the successful evolution of public
cooperation.
In terms of solving actual common goods problems, our work might have merit in situations with strong
diversity in roles and group sizes. One representative example of such a situation is climate change governance,
where existing research has shown that local institutions are an effective way to promote the emergence of
widespread cooperation [16]. Since our results are derived not only from local institutions, but take into
account also the heterogeneous interaction environment, they could offer further advice on how to arrive at
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globally acceptable climate policies [68].
While the evolution of institutions remains a puzzle [8], their importance for enforcing socially acceptable
behavior in human societies can hardly be overstated. Although institutionalized punishment appears to
be prevailing, recent research concerning the effectiveness of punishment, for example related to antisocial
punishment [69,70], reciprocity [71], and reward [24,72], is questioning the aptness of sanctioning for elevating
collaborative efforts and raising social welfare. Indeed, although the majority of previous studies addressing the
“stick versus carrot” dilemma concluded that punishment is more effective than reward in sustaining public
cooperation [73], evidence suggesting that rewards may be as effective as punishment and lead to higher total
earnings without potential damage to reputation or fear from retaliation is mounting [25,74,75]. In particular,
Rand and Nowak [70] argue convincingly that healthy levels of cooperation are likelier to be achieved through
less destructive means. We hope that our study will prove to be inspirational for further research aimed at
discerning the importance of positive and negative reciprocity for human cooperation, as well as for looking
closely at their correlated effects [26, 76].
Methods
We consider the evolutionary public goods game on the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network [59, 60]. Each
player x occupies one node of the network, and it can choose between cooperation (sx = 1) and defection
(sx = 0) as the two competing strategies. To each public goods game cooperators contribute the cost c = 1,
while defectors contribute nothing. The payoff of player x who is member in the group Gy, which is centered
on player y, depends on the size of the group ky +1 (here ky is also the degree of node y), on the number of
cooperators nc in the group, and on the enhancement factor r. In addition to the payoffs stemming from the
public goods game, each group receives institutional incentives Ix = (kx+1)δ to be used either for rewarding
cooperators or for punishing defectors, where δ is the average amount of available incentives.
When the incentives are used for rewarding, a cooperator y with degree ky that is member in the group
















where α is the distribution strength. According to the definition of the payoffs, for α > 0 high-degree nodes
obtain larger rewards than low-degree nodes, while for α < 0 low-degree nodes receive a larger share from the
incentive pool.
If the incentives are used for punishing defectors rather than rewarding cooperators, then a cooperator y
















As by institutionalized rewarding, here to α > 0 implies high-degree nodes are punished stronger than low-
degree nodes, and vice versa for α < 0.
Each player x participates in kx + 1 public goods games, which are staged in groups that are centered on
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After playing the games, a player is allowed to learn from one of its randomly chosen neighbors y and update
its strategy accordingly. The probability of strategy change is given by the Fermi function [77, 78]
f =
1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/K]
, (1)
if we assume that absolute payoff are considered. However, previous research has emphasized also the impor-
tance of degree-normalized payoffs [38, 41, 64–66], in which case the probability of strategy change is
f =
1
1 + exp[(Px/kx − Py/ky)/K]
. (2)
We consider both absolute (Eq. 1) and degree-normalized (Eq. 2) payoffs to be representative for the evo-
lutionary fitness of individual players. Especially for institutional punishment, the solution of the considered
optimization problem depends significantly on this difference. Without losing generality we set the uncertainly
in the strategy adoption process to K = 0.1 [58], so that it is very likely that the better performing players
will be imitated, although it is also possible that players will occasionally learn from those performing worse.
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Enhancement factor r = 1 Enhancement factor r = 2
Figure 1. Evolution of cooperation with institutional rewarding and absolute payoffs. Top row depicts
the stationary fraction of cooperators as a function of the average amount of available incentives δ for
different values of the distribution strength α. The enhancement factor is r = 1 in (a) and r = 2 in (b).
Bottom row depicts the contour plot of the fraction of cooperators as a function of α and δ, as obtained
for the enhancement factor r = 1 in (c) and r = 2 in (d).
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Figure 2. Time evolution of the mean payoff difference between cooperators and defectors (top row)
and the fraction of cooperators (bottom row) as a function of degree k for three typical values of α.
Institutional rewarding and absolute payoffs apply. The insets of (a) and (b) show the mean payoff
difference between cooperators and defectors for low-degree and middle-degree nodes during the early
stages of evolution. During the evolutionary process, if the enhancement factor is small, cooperators
always have a higher mean payoff than defectors at an intermediate value of α. Parameter values are
r = 1 and δ = 0.5.



















































































































Figure 3. The same results as presented in Fig. 2, as obtained for a larger enhancement factor but a
smaller average amount of available incentives. Parameter values are r = 2 and δ = 0.3.
Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation 15






































Enhancement factor r = 1 Enhancement factor r = 2
Figure 4. Evolution of cooperation with institutional punishment and absolute payoffs. Top row
depicts the stationary fraction of cooperators as a function of the average amount of available incentives
δ for different values of the distribution strength α. The enhancement factor is r = 1 in (a) and r = 2 in
(b). Bottom row depicts the contour plot of the fraction of cooperators as a function of α and δ, as
obtained for the enhancement factor r = 1 in (c) and r = 2 in (d).
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Figure 5. Time evolution of the mean payoff difference between cooperators and defectors (top row)
and the fraction of cooperators (bottom row) as a function of degree k for three typical values of α.
Institutional punishment and absolute payoffs apply. The insets of (a) and (b) show the mean payoff
difference between cooperators and defectors for low-degree and middle-degree nodes during the early
stages of evolution. During the evolutionary process, if the enhancement factor is small, cooperators
always have a higher mean payoff than defectors at an intermediate value of δ. Parameter values are
r = 1 and δ = 0.5.












































































































Figure 6. The same results as presented in Fig. 5, as obtained for a larger enhancement factor but a
smaller average amount of available incentives. Parameter values are r = 2 and δ = 0.3.
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Figure 7. Evolution of cooperation with institutional rewarding and degree-normalized payoffs. Top
row depicts the stationary fraction of cooperators as a function of the average amount of available
incentives δ for different values of the distribution strength α. The enhancement factor is r = 1 in (a),
r = 2 in (b), and r = 3 in (c). Bottom row depicts the contour plot of the fraction of cooperators as a
function of α and δ, as obtained for the enhancement factor r = 1 in (d), r = 2 in (e), and r = 3 in (f).
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Figure 8. Evolution of cooperation with institutional punishment and degree-normalized payoffs. Top
row depicts the stationary fraction of cooperators as a function of the average amount of available
incentives δ for different values of the distribution strength α. The enhancement factor is r = 1 in (a),
r = 2 in (b), and r = 3 in (c). Bottom row depicts the contour plot of the fraction of cooperators as a
function of α and δ, as obtained for the enhancement factor r = 1 in (d), r = 2 in (e), and r = 3 in (f).
